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BOOK REVIEWS
CONTRACT LAW AS A SYSTEM OF VALUESt
THE LAW OF CONTRACT. By Hugh Collins.* Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, London. 1986. Pp. xi, 236. £7.50.

Reviewed by Jack M. Beermann**

Contract law has changed dramatically since the heyday of free contract
ideology. The false conflict in the cases and literature between facilitation of
market transactions and regulation to achieve social aims has been transcended, largely due to the realization that social aims are behind all of
contract law. In place of this false conflict, new questions about the values
advanced through contract law have been posed. Contract theory needs an
account of the values underlying doctrines that were previously justified
(wrongly) as means to effectuate the intent of the parties. Hugh Collins has
given us such an account in his new book, The Law of Contract.1
The skeptical reader might protest that contract doctrine does not look all
that different today than it did in the late nineteenth century. Judicial
opinions abound in contemporary reports that appear to rest exclusively on
freedom of contract ideology. It is difficult, in fact, to find cases that
explicitly discuss the values that Collins says provide the foundation for
modem contract law. 2 Collins admits throughout the book that free contract
ideology still plays an important role in contract law and that many contemt © by Jack M. Beermann, all rights reserved.
* Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford University.
** Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, J.D., University of Chicago. Thanks to David Addis for his
research assistance, and to Joe Singer and Mark Pettit for comments on an earlier.
draft. Thanks also to David Seipp for help with the history of contract law; any
mistakes in this regard are my own.
I H. COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (1986).

See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. The book contains excellent descriptions of how judges achieve various moral goals but use classical contract concepts in
2

a terribly distorted fashion. Thus, the inability to locate decisions that explicitly
discuss the values Collins has in mind does not indicate that the values are not there.
Collins attributes the unwillingness to break out of the old way of writing contract law
opinions to the nature of the judicial process and the fear of criticism. See H.
COLLINS, supra note 1, at 121.
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porary decisions are explainable only as resting on adherence to notions of
free contract. Collins does not claim, then, that the values he identifies
explain all of contract law. Rather, he claims that the values he identifies
have, to some extent, supplanted free contract thinking, and that even in
cases influenced by free contract ideals, these values temper free contract
ideals. And Collins makes a good case that current law has strayed from the
classical, uninhibited market model.
Collins's book is important as an attempt to reconstruct the common law
around a group of values. Lately, critiques of common law, and of law
generally, have threatened lawyers' confidence in law's ability to effectuate
social policy. Critical Legal Studies has attacked contract law for its indeterminacy and for its unwillingness to adapt to the ground rules of the
modern social welfare state. 3 Collins's project of connecting legal doctrines
with values is difficult because both the doctrines and the values are indeterminate. Any argument that a doctrine advances a specific value can be
met with a counter-argument that rests on a different meaning of the doctrine
or value. Those of us who still believe in law, but also accept the realist
attack, must learn how to talk about law and make normative arguments
without being paralyzed by indeterminacy theory.
Collins's book successfully provides a framework both for analyzing contemporary contract law and for normative criticism of that doctrine. The
doctrinal reforms that have moved contract law away from strict freedom of
contract norms are not supported by a well-developed theoretical framework. This may lead to preference for free contract because free contract,
with all its faults, rests on a rather firmly established set of principles. The
book offers a competing set of values that could provide an alternate framework for contract law. This would legitimize doctrinal deviations from free
contract ideology and open a path to further reform. Collins's greatest
success in this book is in his explication of this competing set of values for
the modern law of contract.
This review is divided into two parts. Part I is largely a description of the
book's contents, with comments on its major theoretical propositions. This
part includes a critique of Collins's discussion of corporatism in contract
law. The focus here is on whether corporatism in contract law is connected
to the substantive transformation that Collins describes in the remainder of
the book. Part II is a discussion of the relationship between Collins's description of the law of contract and the law as it appears in the reporters.
This second part also discusses the general relationship between theory and
doctrine.
I.

METHODOLOGY, DOCTRINE, AND THEORY

One of the first things law students learn is that contract law is not
concerned only with facilitation of voluntary transactions. Contract law
3

See generally Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstructionof Contract Doctrine, 94

YALE

L.J. 997 (1985) (showing the indeterminacy of contract law).
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comprises complex principles and rules that regulate the market system so
that transactions are enforced only if the law's substantive requirements are
satisfied. 4 The theoretical problem has been to break out of the conceptualization of contract law as a core of facilitation of voluntary agreements with
a periphery of regulation. This project requires an explanation of the normative judgments that inform the concept of voluntariness and an understanding of the values that determine when and how contracts are enforced. In
more traditional discussions of contract law, individual deviations from
enforcement of voluntary transactions are explained in a micro-context with
a focus on particular problems involving the transaction. Only rarely do the
traditional discussions rely on the type of transaction in explaining why the
agreement is not enforced. 5
Contract law structures a set of institutions that compose the market
system of allocating goods and services in the economy. Collins therefore
attempts to analyze contract law in the context of market transactions and
the market system generally. This methodology, Collins argues, will enable
him to find in contract law inherent principles other than the principle of
6
enforcing the will of the parties.
Collins's thesis is that modem contract law advances, through regulation
of market transactions, "the communitarian values comprising assistance to
the weak and handicapped, fairness in the distribution of wealth, and altruistic concern for the interests of others." 7 These values, which Collins sometimes refers to more abstractly as fairness, paternalism, trust, and cooperation,8 are the ideals of social justice underlying the welfare state, and they
have been incorporated into the law of contract. 9 Collins attempts to illus-

4 Collins characterizes the freedom to negotiate terms of a contract as "a privilege
granted on stringent conditions." H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 2.
- The preexisting duty rule, which bars enforcement of one-sided modifications of
a contract, provides a good example. The operation of the rule is ascribed to the rules
requiring consideration. If any attempt is made to explain why the agreement should
not be enforced, the potential for duress employed through threats of withholding
performance is cited as the ground for the rule. Yet these explanations are made only
in passing, almost as an afterthought. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 277-78
(1982). One of the reasons that contract law itself has not made distinctions between
different types of contracts might be that once such distinctions are made, law
regulating specific arrangements is broken off from the main body of contract law and
reconstituted as an independent body of doctrine. See generally G. GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (discussing the dissolution of an independent contract
law).
6 See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 2.
I1d. at 1.
8 Id. at ix.
a Id. at 1. The substantive transformation of contract law, according to Collins, has
been accompanied by a procedural complement in which power has devolved to
participatory, private groups. See id. at 208. For my discussion and criticism of this
part of Collins's argument, see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
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trate how specific doctrines and interpretive techniques in the cases reflect
these values.
This methodology has obvious consequences for the organization of the
book. Instead of focusing on discrete doctrinal categories alone,' 0 Collins
focuses on (1) the context of the social relations in the market, (2) the values
upon which contract law is based," and (3) the doctrinal divisions of contract law.
Philosophical and Social Groundwork

A.

1. The Role of Contract Law
Collins takes an overtly instrumentalist view of contract law, stating that it
channels and regulates market transactions according to ideals of social
justice. 12 He rejects the view that contract law serves only to facilitate
market transactions, arguing that the rules of contract law promote many,
and ofttimes conflicting, social values. 13
One of the most significant changes in contract law that Collins identifies is
the breakdown of the classical model. The classical model analyzed rules
abstractly, without considering the social context in which they operated.
Contract rules were thought to serve only one purpose, and the way to learn
about contract law was to look only at the rules. The rise of instrumentalism
requires that rules be evaluated in their social contexts. This means that
contract rules must be evaluated and understood, not as instances of the
general principle of free will, but in terms of their consequences. Contract
law creates and distributes power in the marketplace and provides incentives
and disincentives designed to channel the use of that power. Thus, the way
to learn about contract law today is to examine the institutions that it

I0

See, e.g., E.

note 5, at ix-xvii;
(2d ed. 1977).
supra note 1, at v-vii.

FARNSWORTH,Supra

J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS xxiii-xlv
l"
2

See H. COLLINS,
Id. at 1.

13 Collins's presentation is a bit unclear because he is reluctant to admit that the
libertarian principles that motivated free contract theory are still important to contract law. As noted above, Collins states that the social values promoted by contract

law are "assistance to the weak and handicapped, fairness in the distribution of
wealth, and altruistic concern for the interests of others." Id. at 1. Collins explains
differences in tests for enforceability of contracts, including consideration and reliance theory, as depending on conflicting views regarding efficiency, liberty, and
privacy. See id. at 22-47. Collins neglects the possibility, which I discuss infra, that
there are conflicting views about what these values are. In any event, contract law
has not abandoned the values underlying nineteenth-century free contract doctrine;
rather, as Collins more accurately states in his preface, the newer values infuse
contemporary contract doctrine. Id. at ix. The new and old values coexist, creating a
confusing and incoherent body of doctrine.
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regulates and to observe ways in which contract law furthers the operation
of those institutions. Furthering the operation of institutions is not neutral:
the law will advance certain institutional arrangements at the expense of
others.
Collins identifies the breakdown of free market theory and the movement
toward understanding contract law in its social context as a double transformation in the law of contract. 14 By looking at the operation of contract law in
society, one can discern a movement toward promoting values of fairness,
trust and cooperation. Legal discourse has also changed. Collins argues that
contract law is less particularistic than it once was; when it designs or
advances institutional arrangements, it operates at a higher level of generality, revealing, to a greater extent, the values underlying the doctrine. 15 In
other words, the technical rules that make up contract law are less important
than the general principles or standards that guide the development of the
rules. 16 The process of reasoning is thus both inductive and deductive. It is
inductive insofar as examples lead to conclusions about the social vision
from which contract law arises. But the reasoning is deductive in cases
where conflicting questions center on how doctrine can best advance moral
aims.
Collins's functional theory of the law of contract assigns to contract law a
key role in important social operations. He states that the market creates, to
a great extent, the "order of wealth and power" in "modern Western
societies." 17 Contract law sets the ground rules for the working of the
market and is thus vital to the established social order. Collins acknowledges
that some theorists believe that the market functions independently of law or
that law is merely reflective of the extra-legal order, but Collins insists that
law in modern society creates the norms or standards of conduct that exist
by tradition or custom in other societies. My instincts lead me to agree with
Collins that law is important in establishing many of the norms of conduct in
various aspects of economic life, but I remain critical of claims that elevate
law to a primary role. There is still room for uncertainty about the importance of law to the function of the market. 18
A key function of the market, as constituted by law, is to establish the

See id. at ix.
15See id. at ix.
1 Id. at 15-16.
171 Id. at 3.
18 See Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
14

Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986). Ellickson's study of relations
between farmers and ranchers indicates that law was important to his subjects in that
they thought they were regulating their conduct according to it. However, the
farmers and ranchers had their own ideas about what the law required, ideas which
often did not correspond to reality. Law, as an ideal, might influence conduct, but the
particulars of the actual law may not be all that important. Id. at 685.
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distribution of wealth for society. Collins argues that under the market
economy wealth is distributed according to the results of trading in the
marketplace, a distributional system that rewards superior information and
expertise. 1 9 He views inheritance and other non-market transfers as alterations of this basic pattern. But the presence of non-market transfers of
wealth, and the importance of bargaining power to the distribution of wealth
that the market creates, undermine Collins's presentation of the market as a
meritocracy that generally respects personal dignity. The terms of contracts
are affected by the relative power of the parties, and that relative power is
determined by the legal rules. 20 Collins bypasses some of the more devastating criticisms of the market because he plays down the importance of raw
power to the distribution of wealth under the market.
2.

The Transformation of Contract Law

The "justice of exchange,"" as Collins calls the ideal underlying the
distribution of wealth under the market, was defended as respecting personal
autonomy and dignity, and providing a set of incentives for economic activity. The emergence of the welfare state illustrates that society no longer
accepts the "justice of exchange. ' 2 Under the social welfare regime, a
"legislative framework supplants the market order with compulsory obligations of social insurance .... -23 Today the market is supplemented by
social welfare legislation that wrests control over aspects of the distribution
from the marketplace.
Free market exchange is supplemented not only by social welfare wealth
transfers, but also by many reforms of contract law itself. Collins says that
the liberal response to the injustice of the distribution of wealth under the

19 H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 3. Collins points out that the justice of the market
distribution is supported by the market's refusal to recognize claims of privilege;
ability to succeed in the market economy is not explicitly distributed according to
social class. Id. at 4. This, for Collins, is progressive when compared to the feudal
structure that capitalism replaced. Id. at 9. I think Collins unduly discounts the
importance of privilege in modem society. Wealth is heavily concentrated in many
Western countries, and laws allowing inheritance and allowing parents to pay for
private education (and allowing state governments to finance public schools from
local property taxes, see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S.1, 46 (1973)) have enormous effects on the opportunities for success of people
not born into wealth. The equality of opportunity so vital for the justice of the market
distribution is largely mythical.
0

See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 29 (1927); Hale,

Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci.

(1923).
2,H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 32, 204.
22 Id. at 9.
23 Id.

Q. 470
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exchange model has been to advocate individual responsibility in the form of
generalized duties of care (such as the reliance model) in place of the simple
identification of voluntary consent. 2 4 The liberal response is viewed by
Collins as inadequate because it fails to account for many of the changes in
contract law and because it is inadequate to prevent the injustices that the
market can create even with expanded duties of care. 5
Collins details three major problems with the market system that he argues
precipitated many of the modem reforms of contract law. First, contract law
oppressed the weak by adopting a very broad definition of voluntary agreement, enforcing all such agreements and ignoring questions concerning the
origins of ownership and the power ownership entails. 26 To prevent such
domination, modem law has responded with increased regulation of both the
uses of bargaining power and the content of contracts . 27 The second problem
with the "justice of exchange" was that it legitimated a distribution of
wealth that made it impossible for many individuals to enjoy the liberties that
purport to justify the unregulated market in the first instance. 28 Contract law
is now much more likely to regulate the fairness of contracts, and the welfare
state also intervenes to ameliorate the harshness of the market's distribution
of wealth. 29 The third problem with earlier contract law is its insistence on an
image of the world of economic relations as competition between antagonistic individuals. Collins argues that the world is now more accurately described as a set of interdependent relationships in which the legal system
protects and encourages cooperation and accommodation. 30
Collins argues that the reliance model, in which non-contractual promises
2

4 Id. at 11.

Id. This is one point of several at which I was uncertain whether Collins was
claiming that the rejected description was wrong as a description or whether it was
normatively erroneous. In other words, it was unclear to me whether Collins was
claiming that the law has moved beyond reliance type theories in its rejection of
individualistic markets or whether, given his criticisms of the exchange model, the
law should move beyond individualism altogether. This lack of clarity is not necessarily a weakness because it is an important method of persuasion in legal analysis to
present reforms as if they are close to settled law.
26 H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 11-12.
17 Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 13-14. Collins recognizes here that one of the primary reasons for preferring a market economy to a state-planned economy is that the market allows for
greater expression of individual preferences and thus more liberty. Id. This means
that the degree to which the law regulates the fairness of contracts is tempered by the
law's desire to protect liberty. In practice this contributes to the indeterminacy of the
common law system; the line between regulation to achieve liberty and regulation for
fairness is not clear and decisions will not be the product of the rules of contract law
but rather will arise from the decisionmaker's views on fairness and liberty.
,9 Id. at 14.
30 Id. at 14-15.
15
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can create liability if the promisee relies on the promise, does not capture the
sorts of reforms that follow from these criticisms of the law of contract and
the market because it suffers from the problem identified in the third criticism. Because the reliance model focuses on individuals, it can still allow
domination and unfairness. Reconstituting the world in a communitarian
image allows the legal system to pursue the goals of fairness and cooperation
within a system that recognizes inequalities and does not allow these inequalities to be exploited by stronger parties. Reliance theory, with its
31
requirement of a promise, simply fails to address these concerns.
One of Collins's most important methodological points is that contract
rules must be analyzed in the context of particular market realities. 32 In other
words, different market arrangements need different legal frameworks;
therefore, in order to criticize the law, one must have a clear picture of the
social arrangement to be regulated. Collins uses the example of the complicated transactions concerning the sale and servicing of new automobiles to
illustrate that economic relationships are more complex than the two traders
in the competition model. 33 The manufacturer relies on dealers to sell and
service the automobiles, on consumers to buy them, and on finance companies to help consumers pay. The dealers rely on the manufacturer for a
supply of cars and for advertising, on the finance company to finance both
the inventory and the consumer purchase, and on the consumer to purchase
the automobile. The consumer relies on the manufacturer to produce a
quality automobile, on the dealer to help select a product and repair it, and
on the finance company to help with the purchase price. The finance company relies on all of the others to use its services. The legal system suffers if
it adheres to a false picture that portrays these relationships only as antagonistic individuals competing in the marketplace. 34 The law of contract
Collins explains the differences and the similarities between contract theory and
reliance theory very clearly in his Contract Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL
THEORY AND COMMON LAW 136-54 (W. Twining ed. 1986). Contract theory is based
on choice while reliance theory is based on protection of interests. Id. Collins
demonstrates in that work that both choice theory and interests theory rest on moral
visions of the good society and do not meet the liberal neutrality criteria. In many
ways, Collins's explanation of reliance theory in the Twining book is richer and more
complete than that in Collins's own book.
32 This is not inconsistent with Collins's earlier point, see supra note 15 and
accompanying text, that legal principles operate with greater generality than before.
Under current law, more general principles are applied in narrower contexts.
33 See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 10-11.
34 See id. at 9. Reshaping law by telling a different story about the world is an
important element of critical methodology. See J. Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property (1987) (unpublished manuscript). Even though it is often possible to tell a
different story about the world, I am uncertain about how much the world actually
has changed. It is difficult to know whether the world is a more interdependent place
or whether ideology has created that image. Redescription of the world along ideolog31
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has changed, according to Collins, as the economic world has become a
more interdependent place. As a theoretical matter, the interdependence of
economic relationships has replaced voluntariness as the central explanatory
factor in market regulation.
3. The Institutions of Lawmaking: Of Politics and Corporatism
Collins believes that in order to understand the law, one must study the
institutions that produce the law. 35 Thus, he compares the lawmaking functions of the judiciary, the legislature, and private organizations. Collins
notes that many of the more innovative reforms in contract law have been
the product of legislative intervention rather than common law development,
since legislators have the political authority to inquire explicitly into questions of distributive justice. 36 He says that judges are not able to be as
innovative or adaptive as legislators because judges, under current notions
of the appropriate judicial role, are constrained by the necessity of appearing
to apply the law to their decisions instead of actually creating the law. The
false expectation that law evolves through a neutral system also impedes
even statutory innovation because the legislature will appear to be embarking on blatantly redistributive programs while the judicial system maintains
its appearance of objectivity.
I am surprised that Collins uncritically adopted this structure for analyzing the judicial role. Notions of the appropriate judicial role are very controversial 37 and even in the classical period it is not clear that common law
judges were as passive as Collins describes. Judges established contract law
to distribute wealth according to success in the marketplace because they
thought that was a good way for the system to operate. They refused to
reform the system because they preferred the existing rules to any proposed
alternatives. I do not think this is passive; it's just conservative. I have
always found the "factual" bases for the preference of legislatures for
policymaking or "political" decisionmaking dubious. When courts want to
act they do not let such matters get in their way. Collins acknowledges that
the line between legal and political argument has become more blurry in
recent times, and I think much can be said for abandoning the distinction
altogether.

ical lines is related to the portrayal of reformist tendencies in legal doctrine as settled
law. See supra note 25.
35 See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 15-16.
36 Id. at 16-20.
37 Cf. Beermann, Crisis? What Crisis? 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1383 (1986) (discussing
appropriate role for federal judges); Singer, Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1983) (discussing dilemma of judicial activism versus judicial
passivism).
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Contemporary contract law is not made only by public institutions.
Decision-making power is divided among more than private parties in economic relationships and government agencies exercising public power.
There are also private groups that partake of both sorts of power. Private
trade associations representing interested individuals and groups engage in
bargaining on a large scale over the terms of trade-wide standard agreements. 38 Private arbitrators adjudicate disputes, thus employing the power to
establish the norms of conduct that constitute contract law. 39 While these
sorts of arrangements have been around for a long time, 40 Collins says that
the infusion of public law norms into private civil society constitutes
a "third
41
transformation" of the law of contract: the rise of corporatism.
The important examples of corporatist behavior are negotiation of standard form contracts by interested groups; arbitration of grievances under
these and other contracts; self-regulation of professions by private organizations like bar associations and other trade groups; and collective bargaining
over the terms and conditions of employment, which often takes place
between an association of employers and a group of local unions. 42 Public
agencies supervise these forms of private governance, and courts subject
these private decisions to judicial review, but these private groups exercise
significant discretionary power.
Collins believes that the corporatist pattern he outlines is a procedural
complement to the infusion of substantive communitarian values into contract law. 43 He says that a corporatist system can preserve the efficient
elements of a market while also providing "a more comprehensive approach
to questions of the distribution of power and wealth." 44 Collins believes that
corporatism can provide an opportunity to provide for a more participatory
form of economic governance and can be used to "[avoid] the distributive
unfairness and organizations of domination which the classical system per45
mitted."
38

See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 205.

39 See id.
40 See Post, Equitable Resorts Before 1450, in LAW, LITIGANTS AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 73-74 (E.W. Ives & A.D. Manchester eds. 1983); H.W. ARTHURS,

'WITHOUT

THE

LAW':

NINETEENTH-CENTURY
41
COLLINS,

ADMINISTRATIVE
ENGLAND

JUSTICE AND

LEGAL PLURALISM

IN

50 (1985).

H.
supra note 1, at 203-09 (chapter entitled "Corporatism").
Id. at 205-06. Corporatism is part of a larger pattern of privatization which
places previously governmental power in private hands. Good examples of privatization involve recent sales, both in England and the United States, of previously
publicly held industries into private ownership.
43 Id. at 208-09. It is thus no historical accident that corporatism is associated in
the United States with the reforms of the New Deal. See generally P. IRONS, THE
NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982) (describing corporatist structure of New Deal recovery
programs).
44 H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 208.
41

45

Id.
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I do not understand why Collins thinks that contemporary corporatism is a
good thing. Collins explains that corporatism transcends the public/private
dichotomy, allowing private business to function away from the "stranglehold" of public bureaucracies, and that corporatist government is "participatory and devolved," therefore resembling the communitarian values of
contract law. 46 1 agree with the first half of his statement, but I am not so sure
about the second.
Many corporatist arrangements delegate what looks like governmental
power to private organizations. But nothing in the organizational structure of
such institutions makes me confident that the organizations are looking out
for the welfare of the weaker members of society who are affected by their
policies. Trade associations do not elect their members or representatives
from the public at large; they are chosen from the ranks of the trade itself.
Trade associations are also subject to takeover by factions just like government. Wealthier and more powerful members of trade associations might use
stringent standards of conduct to drive weaker competitors out of the business. Although the power of trade associations may be more decentralized
than that of government bureaucracies, devolution of power to small but
undemocratic power centers is not a victory for democracy.
It is a familiar understanding that trade associations often seek government regulation to protect their members' profit margins. The same associations, left largely to their own devices, could substitute private regulation for
what was previously promulgated by the government. The potential for
domination of consumers by trade associations made up of all manufacturers
of a product or providers of a service seems to be much greater than if there
were no such organizations. An example of a group like this is real estate
associations. Real estate associations in many localities in the United States
promulgate standard form residential leases that are extremely unfavorable
to the tenant. If one assumes that groups seek legislation in order to
maximize their own welfare, then the members of the trades in which
corporatism exists most strongly will view it as the best method of maximizing their own welfare. Trades that succeed in a non-corporatist setting may
not set up powerful trade associations and may not push for the legal reforms
necessary to give legal sanction to the activities of such associations. Only if
the members of the trade feel that their position can be maximized through
corporatism will they push for it.
Thus I am not confident that corporatism is necessarily linked to progress
in contract law. The potential for democratic reform of the economic system
is great, but I am not persuaded that it will come in the form of greater
private governance, unless the private institutions are forced to open themselves up to input and influence from all affected groups.

46

Id.
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Values and Doctrine in Contract Law

It is incredibly difficult to take a confusing body of legal doctrine like
contract law and draw any conclusions regarding the values underlying the
doctrine. Collins concentrates his efforts on illustrating how values of fairness, altruism (or cooperation), and paternalism appear throughout contract
law. He admits that even under current law, these values are often balanced
against considerations of liberty and efficiency that might point toward
maintaining the minimally regulated market. Collins's work is an important
step toward incorporating doctrinal developments into contract theory, despite the obstacles facing his effort.
Fairness refers to movements toward a more equitable distribution of
wealth and power in society. In the welfare state, concerns of fairness in this
sense are addressed mainly through social welfare legislation. Contract law
reforms play only a small part in implementing society's decision to ameliorate the harsh distributional consequences of the unregulated market. 47 In
part this is due to the difficulty in using contract law to effectuate major
reforms. Even when contract law acts, the reforms remain hidden and
obscure, expressed in largely traditional contract terminology.
Collins ties his discussion of fairness to doctrines such as unconscionability, unequal bargaining power, and mistake. It is through those doctrines
that courts police the fairness of individual contracts. Under unconscionability and unequal bargaining power doctrines, courts police the fairness of the
bargain by focusing both on the negotiation process and the substantive
results of the bargain. Collins notes that courts, acting under these doctrines,
measure the fairness of the bargain by market standards: a price is unfair if it
deviates substantially from the market price under conditions that indicate
more than typical disparities in bargaining power. 48 This factor ensures that
the law will not make radical changes through these doctrines since the
measuring stick, the marketplace, is not likely to produce radical shifts in
49
economic power from sellers to consumers.
Collins admits that courts rarely, if ever, directly regulate the price term of
a contract. 50 Rather, courts regulate fairness indirectly, in ways that are tied
to the other values, paternalism and cooperation, that underlie Collins's
analysis.
In addition to fairness, paternalism and altruism are important new values

47 Collins argues that society has rejected the political view that the unregulated
market results in a fair distribution of wealth and power. Id. at 139-41.
48

Id. at 147.

49 Id. at 148.

50 He makes the insightful point that in mistake cases, a finding of the materiality of
the mistake is often determined, or at least heavily influenced, by the disparities
between value and price. Id. at 145. He also notes that legislation such as rent control
and usury laws regulate price directly. Id. at 141-42, 150.
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that explain recent developments in contract law. Collins adopts a rather
narrow definition of paternalism in contract law. To Collins, paternalism
appears in modern contract law as a means of preventing strong parties from
dominating weaker parties. 5 ' Collins acknowledges that paternalism in its
broadest sense means intervention to set the terms of an arrangement according to the government's notions of what is good for the parties regardless of what the parties desire. 52 He raises the notion of paternalism as
explaining the invalidation of contracts that violate the community's moral
standards, 53but in most of the discussion he abandons that notion in favor of
the power relations model mentioned above. 54 This fits well with Collins's
general insistence that a doctrine must be understood in its social context
and not in isolation. Onerous terms may be repugnant only because they
place a weak party at the mercy of the stronger, and the very same terms
might be perfectly valid if the contract were between two large corporations
and not a consumer and a finance company. In contract, then, paternalism
should be understood in light of considerations regarding bargaining power
and the like. 55

Altruism encompasses the value that the law places on cooperation.
Collins uses the example of the performance of long term contracts to
56
illustrate how altruism and paternalism motivate current contract law.
Unforeseen circumstances often cause oppressive consequences for one
party to such contracts. Under classical rules, the allocation of the risks
according to the supposed intent of the parties would be dispositive, and
even if the eventuality was not covered by a term in the contract, the court
would use implied intent to solve the problem. 57 Concerns of altruism today
might lead courts to require the parties to cooperate and arrive at a reasonable accommodation. Concerns of paternalism might prevent terms of such

51See id. at 116.
See id. at 115-16. Paternalism has been defined to include all government
intervention that purports to replace the will of a party with what the decisionmaker
thinks is better for the party. See Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in
52

Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 572 (1982).
53 H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 115.
54 See, e.g., id. at 117 (explaining invalidation of wrap-around consumer financing
arrangements on grounds of oppression of the weaker party, not moral repugnance of
the terms).
55 Hence the requirement of both procedural and substantive unconscionability; a
contract that is unfair will not be invalidated unless there is a problem in the
bargaining process as well as with the substance of the transaction.
56 H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 158.
57 Cf. id. at 153-54 (citing Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W.2d 919
(1887) (setting aside contract for sale of a pregnant cow on grounds of mistake where
price indicated sale of a barren, and not fertile, cow)).
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contracts from allowing domination of one party over another. 58 Thus,
courts have revised the pricing formula in long term contracts and have
allowed termination of an apparently perpetual arrangement, achieving what
might be viewed as a fairer result.59 In this way, paternalism and altruism
complement fairness.
Cooperation values are most influential in modification and termination of
contracts. 60 Businesses have strong incentives to allow their trading partners
to modify contracts when the terms become onerous, even when under strict
contractual norms they would be entitled to stand on their contract rights.
Parties do not wish, in most circumstances, to drive their trading partners
out of business because of the potential benefits of future trading and good
will. 61 Current law, most notably Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, allows parties, in the spirit of cooperation, to modify their contracts to
meet the exigencies they face. 62 The important point for Collins is that the
duty to cooperate, and rules that encourage cooperation, pervade all aspects
of performance of contracts.
Collins also attempts to explain the law of conditions with reference to
situations in which cooperation should be required. 63 Contract terms are
conditions, breach of which excuses performance by the innocent party,
only if as a matter of fairness the duty of performance should be excused.
Collins notes that parties with power could insist on labeling unimportant
terms "conditions," and the courts would respect the label under classical
intent theory. This would allow the more powerful party to terminate the
contract on the slightest pretext.64 In the name of fairness, and in order to
encourage cooperation, the courts no longer respect the parties' label, but
instead decide independently whether a breach warrants termination. 65
58 Id. at 158-59 (citing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, 499 F. Supp. 53
(W.D. Pa. 1980) (revising price term in long term contract)).
59 Id.
60 See id. at 166-77. Cooperation is also important in the negotiation stages in
which the law imposes duties of good faith and modest disclosure requirements. See
id. at 85.
61 See id. at 167.
62, U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1978); see also H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 168.
6- H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 173-74.
64 See id. at 174-75. (citing L. Schuler AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd.,
[1974] A.C. 236; [1973] 2 All E.R. 39 (a company of sales representatives agreed to
make weekly visits to regular customers as a condition of contract).
65 Id. A great recent example of this substantive doctrine is Judge Posner's opinion
in Morin Building Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983).
In that case, a contract to supply and erect aluminum walls on a factory specified that
all work was to be done "subject to the final approval of" General Motors. Id. at 414.
Despite rather clear language to the contrary, the court held that a reasonableness
requirement should be read into the approval clause because "[i]t is unlikely that
Morin intended to bind itself to a higher and perhaps unattainable standard ....
Id.
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Despite my overall favorable impression of Collins's treatment of values
and doctrine, there are some important issues that Collins either overlooks
or does not express clearly enough. Collins attributes many deviations from
strict enforcement of contracts to changes in views concerning the importance of individual liberty. For example, he argues that the motivating force
behind different tests for enforceability are different views on the appropriate balance between the values of efficiency, liberty, and privacy. Collins
66
describes the rules of consideration, which he calls the "exchange model,"
and the rules of reliance, which he calls the "reliance model, ' 67 and he
illustrates how movement from an exchange-based test to a reliance test
indicates a diminished concern for liberty 68 and
a heightened concern for
69
efficiency, especially in complex transactions.
Collins's argument here rests on the notion that liberty is maximized when
contractual responsibility attaches only under conditions in which the consent requirements of the exchange model are met. This assumes a-very
narrow definition of liberty. The exchange model, as Collins acknowledges,
allows parties with bargaining power to coerce others. Parties with control
over resources coerce others who want or need those resources to enter into
transactions. 70 If reliance theory and other changes in contract law reduce
the potential for such coercion, then liberty for some people is increased.
Duncan Kennedy has shown that the concept of voluntariness is ambiguous
enough to accommodate very different conceptions of free contract. 7 1Projects like Collins's are difficult because the values that Collins argues are
important to contract law, as well as contract law itself, are radically indeterminate. One must recognize the ideological content of concepts like
liberty when one employs them in analysis.

at 416. The court explicitly rejected paternalism as the ground for the rule allowing it
to read the reasonableness requirement into the contract, relying instead on the
implied intent of the parties. Id. at 415. This case thus illustrates that the intent of the
parties is not dispositive but that courts are unwilling to recognize that fact.
66 See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 25.
67 See id. at 36.
See id. at 40.
,9See id. at 45. Collins denies that the reliance model is based on a moral
sentiment in favor of enforcing promises. Id. at 43. Collins argues that there are too
many examples of non-promissory liability to rest the reliance model on the principle
of enforcement of promises. See id. at 52-55. He concludes that rules regarding
contractual responsibility are fashioned with an eye toward conflicting goals of
personal autonomy and altruism. Id. at 55.
"I See Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38

POL. Sci. Q. 470, 472-75 (1923).
71See Kennedy, supra note 53 at 580-83. Kennedy argues that the expansion of
contract defenses such as duress can be viewed as an attempt to maximize the
voluntariness of arrangements. Thus, refusing to enforce contracts might indicate
more, not less, concern for liberty.
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Another weakness in Collins's analysis of particular doctrines is that
sometimes the "ideals of social justice," which he argues contract law is
designed to serve, seem to disappear in favor of other values. This occurred,
for example, in his above noted discussion of enforceability tests. 72 Collins
does, near the end of that chapter, which is entitled "The Ascription of
Responsibility," explain that the reliance model "encourages trust and
responsibility for others," 73 and I think a good case can be made for explaining reliance theory on fairness grounds. 74 Yet by focusing primarily on the
values of efficiency, liberty, and privacy, Collins's account of consideration
and reliance doctrine ends up looking very traditional. Contractual responsibility is explained largely without reference to the values Collins believes
provide the foundations for contract law.
Collins could have avoided this problem by taking some of his own
methodology more seriously. As noted, Collins thinks it is appropriate to
analyze the transformation of contract law together with the social welfare
programs that are common in Western capitalist countries. The existence of
such programs is evidence that the market's distribution of wealth no longer
satisfies the requirements of social justice. Economic responsibility for others in contemporary society is largely non-contractual; for example, tax laws
force members of society to devote a substantial portion of their income to
altruistic endeavors. While market activity might be relatively free from
forced altruism, non-market altruism is extremely important to contemporary social practice. Consideration and reliance thus constitute only a small
portion of the legal rules that create economic responsibilities. It may be
more effective and desirable to legislate altruism in social welfare programs
than to modify consideration doctrine. Viewed from this perspective, it is
not a problem for Collins's analysis that consideration and reliance doctrine
do not rest primarily on the communitarian social values. But Collins should
have included membership in society in his explanation of tests for responsibility, for these non-contractual economic responsibilities-such as paying
taxes-are prime examples of legally required altruism.
I find that several of Collins's doctrinal discussions do not integrate the
values with discussion of the particular doctrines. At times the discussion of

72 See text accompanying notes 67-70.
7.3 H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 45.
74 I may simply be confused here about

Collins's terminology. Perhaps implicit in
his claim that reliance doctrine entails a diminution of personal autonomy is the
argument that personal autonomy is replaced by altruism. It seems to me, however,
that personal autonomy can be threatened by government intervention that has
nothing to do with helping people who are dependent or weak. For example, personal
autonomy is threatened by government regulations which raise prices by creating
barriers to entry in businesses or which even grant monopolies. The recipients of
such benefits are often not sympathetic candidates for altruism. Rather, they have
used their power to procure the favorable regulation.
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the larger social values is either missing or too vague to be of much help. It is
very difficult to explain the intricacies of a doctrine while explaining how the
doctrine is infused with values of paternalism and fairness. Yet I think it is
legitimate to criticize Collins for failing to do this in certain instances. For
example, Collins outlines the rules regarding contract formation and shows
clearly how courts manipulate the rules of offer and acceptance to prevent
parties from taking advantage of each other.75 Offers may not be revoked,
Collins argues, when the possibility of revocation would allow one party to
take advantage of market changes to the disadvantage of the other party.
This obviously smacks of altruism, of forcing one party to look out for the
interests of others. Collins says so, but only in the final paragraph of the
section. 76 There is no discussion of altruism in the body of the discussion of
the cases. The presentation would have been more persuasive and easier on
the reader had Collins raised altruism early on in the discussion and been
specific about which doctrinal moves depended on altruism. 77 My most
serious criticism of the book is that while the discussions all explain what
values are involved in individual doctrines, I was often left to construct the
relationship to the main communitarian values myself.
This criticism is significant when viewed in light of the potentially important contribution that Collins's doctrinal work could make to contract scholarship by providing a framework for integrating progressive elements of
contract law into the main body of doctrine. Collins observes repeatedly that
lawyers are still hung up on the classical model of pure intent-based contract
law, even though doctrinally, contractual norms are less important than
paternalistic ones.' Even law students seem to latch on quickly to the
classical law's hierarchy of intent over regulation.7 9 Given the way the legal
75 See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 77-84 (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Corp., 51
Cal. 2d 409, 33 P.2d 757 (1958) (enforcing subcontractor's mistaken bid upon which
general contractor reasonably relied)).
76 Id. at 83-84. Part of the difficulty here is that Collins is usually very concrete in
his illustrations of how classical theory explains doctrine and how doctrine has
moved beyond the limits of that theory. Collins uses very specific case examples in
that part of the discussion, but he relies on generalities that seem vague in comparison when he discusses the values. Collins's effort could have been improved significantly if he would have illustrated more specifically how the values and doctrines
interact.
17 This problem recurs in Collins's presentation of disputes over the terms of a
contract. The doctrines that impose duties on parties to accurately represent the
terms of an agreement force the stronger parties to engage in altruistic behavior.
Once again, this point is not made explicit until the concluding sentence of the
discussion. See id. at 96-103.
78 See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 127-28.
19 This is true even though scholars have been saying for a long time that contract
law is largely a body of regulation that does not have much tolerance for the intent of
the parties. See, e.g., Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 533 (1933);
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mind tends to work, perhaps the only way to eliminate this discontinuity
between ideology and reality is to create a new, systematic looking, ideological framework for contract law. Collins's book thus goes beyond illustrating
the breakdown of classical contract law and tries to reconstruct contract law
along the lines of a general theory of values.
Thus, I do not mean my criticisms of the lack of integration of valuebased discussions into the doctrinal core to be merely a quibble with the
order of the sentences in the book. For Collins to have succeeded in his
attempt to provide a basis for significant progress in the development of
contract doctrine and theory, it was important to integrate the discussion of
values into the body of the doctrinal descriptions. This is true for two related
reasons. First, one of the weaknesses of more traditional descriptions of
contract doctrine is that the reader often has the impression that the values
are of secondary importance to the writer and thus can be safely ignored or
at least relegated to second-class status. This impression is reinforced by the
absence of value-based discussion in the cases. Second, the law too often
ignores the values that are behind doctrinal developments and detaches the
doctrines from their instrumental concerns. To avoid non-instrumental reasoning, critics should incorporate the values into the main body of doctrinal
discussions, thus ensuring that the reader will not ignore the values in favor
of concentrating only on the rules.
Collins's book is not only a theoretical discussion of contract theory and
methodology. It also contains thorough and comprehensive discussions of
the important features of contract doctrine. These discussions are not meant
to catalog every detail of the legal landscape. Rather, they are comprehensive in that they attempt to provide the reader with a framework for understanding large bodies of doctrine. What I like most about the doctrinal
discussions is that Collins refuses to pigeonhole doctrine according to conventional categories. In fact, the entire organization of the book is designed
to provide an excellent functional understanding of contract law. This allows
Collins to make thought-provoking observations about doctrines that are not
connected in the literature generally. 80
All of Collins's doctrinal discussions proceed in roughly the same manner
as his discussion of consideration and reliance. His discussions of doctrines

see also Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323 (1986).

An example of this sort of observation relates to Collins's discussion of modification of contracts. Collins argues that modification is now freely allowed without
consideration under principles that encourage cooperation between contractual
partners. H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 166-70. He notes that in some circumstances
parties might be under a duty to accept reasonable modifications. This is accomplished by limiting the non-breaching party's damages where a reasonable modification of the contract, as opposed to insistence on strict adherence to original terms,
could have avoided much of the damage. See id. at 170.
80
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are remarkably clear, both as exposition of the doctrinal system and as
illustration of the values underlying the particular rules. 8 ' Collins's doctrinal
method usually begins with a statement of how the classical intent theorists
addressed the issue and how the crazy applications of the classical lawyers
prove that intent cannot be the true explanation. The next step is to show
that in the modem law, intent is not, and should not purport to be, the
explanation for the doctrinal feature. Finally, the main values are raised
again, and their involvement in the doctrine is summarized.
An example of this form of exposition is Collins's discussion of the
relationship between the doctrine of mistake and its connection to the
content of the contractual obligation.8 Classical theory held that a party is
bound only to the terms to which she consented. 83 In most situations,
unforeseen circumstances do not excuse performance. Collins characterizes
this as entailing a presumption of omniscience, because the party burdened
by the unforeseen circumstances is presumed to have consented to performance even under the new circumstances. 8 4 However, classical theory allowed for a doctrine of mistake, and characterized it as resting on the fact
that "the consent of one or both parties to the contract is negatived, because
their intentions rest upon false suppositions of fact." 85 This explanation
cannot work for the classical theorist, Collins argues, because the logic of
the doctrine of mistake would hold that "all relevant mistakes can potentially negative a person's intent." 86 Collins concludes that when courts
determine which mistakes should excuse performance, they are not looking
are balancing the "conflicting interat the intent of the parties but instead
87
ests" of the contractual partners.
Another noteworthy example is the privity doctrine and related rules
determining who is allowed to sue on an obligation. It is clear that the intent
of the parties cannot explain privity rules, which are still apparently important in English law. 8 8 Yet the cases often still purport to explain privity with
regard to the intent and autonomy of the parties. Collins describes how
modem cases, and his independent analysis, regard the privity problem as

should be read in light of the reservations expressed above regarding
instances in which the connection to the main communitarian values could have been
made more effectively.
82 See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 87-95.
83 Id. at 87.
84 Id. at 92.
85 Id. at 94.
86 Id. I was convinced by Collins's argument that mistake does not depend on the
intent of the parties, but notice here again that the values underlying the courts'
decisions are not clearly brought forward.
87 Id. at 94-95.
88 See id. at 104-08.
8' This
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one of fair business arrangements. 89 Courts arrive at fair arrangements by
using a foreseeability test to determine the appropriate parties to sue on a
contract. 90 This effort is a step toward convincing lawyers that privity should
generally be conceived as a fairness problem, not as a problem of intent or
autonomy. In this fashion, throughout the book, Collins shows how numerous cases that appear to deviate from the intent norms of contract law are
consistent with the values he identifies. This is reconstruction.
That is not to say that Collins's method eliminates controversy from
contract law. Returning to the discussion of privity, Collins explains that
privity can sometimes be supported as a way to prevent a "wide class of
beneficiaries" from suing on a contract. 9' Collins does not discuss whether
this decision resulted in a "fair" arrangement, or whether it was consistent
with the general test of reasonable foresight. Restrictions under even the
modern, expansive version of the privity requirements maintain the undemocratic character of the market. Interested parties, such as workers, consumers, and community members, are routinely excluded from the process of
bargaining and determining the proper uses of property. Consumers have
little if any voice in corporate decisionmaking that affects their everyday
lives. The rules of privity, and more general rules establishing corporate
organization and market structures, make our economic system undemocratic. ,
The defense of the market is that consumers vote their preferences with
their money; companies succeed if they fulfill consumer desires. This gives
consumers only an indirect voice, and consumer selection of a product or
service cannot mean anything more than that the product or service is, in the
buyer's opinion, the best available and affordable alternative. It is argued
that consumers should not have a more direct voice because they do not
have the expertise to make the decisions that businesses must make. I think
there are at least two good responses to this argument. First, selecting the
best available alternative requires the same general expertise. If consumers
Id. at 112. Privity is less important today both because of the expansion of
explicit third party rights, largely in the United States, and because lawyers have
successfully used tort cases to avoid privity requirements of contract law. Id. at
108-14.
90 Id. at 108-14 (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (holding lawyer responsible to intended beneficiaries for
negligently drafting a will)).
9 Id. at 108. In the example Collins uses, a class of poor and unemployed persons
attempted to sue as beneficiaries of a contract between a company and the government in which the company agreed to train and employ local residents in an area
designated as suffering from high unemployment and poverty. Id. at 107-08. The
court, according to Collins, held that the government did not intend to grant any legal
rights to the poor and unemployed persons who the legislation was intended to
benefit. Id. at 108 (citing Martinez v. Socoma Co., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841
(1974)).
89
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have this expertise, then their direct input into making better alternatives
might be valuable. Second, voting in governmental elections involves selecting representatives who will act on matters that the average voter may have
even less expertise about than consumer matters. The argument against
economic democracy is even stronger with regard to political democracy. If
consumers can be trusted to vote in business matters with their dollars, I
think they ought to be trusted to vote for representatives or policies as well.
This discussion may be beyond the scope of Collins's focus on contract
law, but it is relevant to an understanding of the institutional framework
within which the market operates. Collins defends the market as providing a
good mechanism for distribution. He warns against excesses in criticism
both against and in favor of the market. The ideology of the market still has a
grip on many of us, and I do not think that fear of the excesses of state
economic planning should make us shy away from criticism of the market
that points toward greater democratization. Many of the doctrinal criticisms
Collins makes illustrate how concerns about domination have motivated
important reforms in the law of contract. Domination is present on a large
scale in modern society, and democracy may be a tool against it.
It should be obvious that the explicit discussions of values are not completely distinct from Collins's more purely doctrinal discussions. Collins
explains doctrine in light of values and values in light of doctrine. While I
found that the connections to classical values are expressed more clearly
than the connections to the communitarian values, the presentation is
generally very effective. Any lawyer reading this book will gain a better
understanding of doctrines that may have seemed vague and unconnected
with the body of contract law. On the other hand, the absence of extended
theoretical discussion of the values that Collins believes reside throughout
contract law makes it a bit difficult to persuade the reader completely. There
is still the nagging question of how much the values are influencing the law
today and how much of current law is explainable in terms of a more
enlightened application of the old norms in light of current business realities.

II.

CONTRACT THEORY AND CONTRACT DOCTRINE

The legal system never discards its old ways and incorporates completely
the discoveries and theories of a new generation of scholars. Typically,
doctrinal development mirrors theoretical evolution imperfectly: the new
generation's scholars think they have debunked previously held beliefs but
the legal system manages to harmonize the old and the new. Contract law
contains elements of several eras of legal thought.92 Collins notes that the
method of common law reasoning constrains judges who wish to change the
92 See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 18 (D. Kairys, ed. 1982) (noting that periods of legal thought are often overlapping).
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law to do so through "an elaboration of the existing legal concepts,' 93 Thus,
the conservative appearance of contemporary judicial opinions will be at
least partly a matter of form.
It is also true, as Collins admits, that contract law is still influenced greatly
by traditional values that promote intent-based responsibility and minimal
government intervention into transactions. There are many judicial decisions to be found in which altruistic and paternalisitic values take a back seat
to free contract ideology. This may not be a cause for worry if it leads to
economic efficiency without great cost to the other values. Collins worries
that too much regulation could destroy the virtues of the market. 94
Collins's desire to balance regulatory values against free market values
makes it difficult to evaluate the accuracy of his description of the law of
contract. Decisions that advance intent-based theories may be consistent
with Collins's description because they preserve the efficiency of the market
at no great cost, or inconsistent because they denigrate the importance of
cooperation and fairness. Collins has, in the end, written a critique that can
be incorporated into a rather moderate theoretical view of contract law. This
fact, together with the anti-progressive nature of legal discourse discussed
above, makes it difficult to examine the connection between legal theory and
legal doctrine.
Nevertheless, I thought it might be interesting to try an informal test of
whether Collins's description of contract law was accurate. I wondered how
often judges actually depart from strict, intent-based liability and how much
they were influenced by the values Collins identifies. I looked at a set of
95
randomly selected recent cases and have the following observations.
My sample contained more cases that at least formally treated contract
law strictly as a matter of intent than cases which appeared to construct
doctrine to further values other than intent. Some of these opinions were in
business situations in which the only value at stake was cooperation, but
several opinions dealt with parties that were dependent on the other party
93 H. COLLINS,
14

supra note 1, at 60.

See id. at 204.

To do this experiment, I asked my research assistant to choose randomly a
recent volume of the Northeastern Reporter, which contains opinions from Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio. The volume he selected was 491 N.E.
2d. I chose the Northeastern Reporter because it contains the reported cases from the
two states with whose law I am best acquainted, Illinois and Massachusetts. The
cases I read came from those two states and, in addition, Indiana and Ohio. For some
reason, this volume of the Northeastern Reporter contained very few New York
decisions, and none raised issues of contract law. I recognize that this is not a
scientific method of doing an empirical study. Also, my sample was fairly smallonly twenty-seven opinions. Therefore, the observations that follow should be taken
as anecdotal. Incidentally, I recommend this type of experiment to any teacher of
contract law. Reading a randomly selected group of cases proved to be quite educational.
15
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and were still held to the rather harsh consequences of the language of the
arrangement. I have divided the opinions into four categories that will be
addressed separately96 : (1) opinions in which consumers were held strictly to
the terms of their agreements; (2) opinions in which consumers were not
held strictly to the terms of their agreements; (3) opinions in which businesses were held strictly to the terms of their agreements; and (4) opinions in
which businesses were not held strictly to the terms of their agreements.
(1) In most of the cases in which consumer contracts were enforced
according to their terms, this meant that the consumers lost, and usually in
situations in which altruism and paternalism would have helped the consumers. Most of these cases involved employees who were at the mercy of their
employer because of the at-will employment rule or other legal rules that
established an unequal balance of power between the parties. In one case,
the Ohio Supreme Court refused to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge
when an employee alleged he was fired for reporting to his employer that the
business was being conducted illegally.9 7 The court quoted with approval its
rule that at-will employees may be fired at any time, for any reason" 'even if
done in gross or reckless disregard of any employee's rights.' ",98 Altruism
would dictate that the employer should watch out for the employee's interests, and paternalism might invalidate at-will contracts as too one-sided for
the employee to have agreed to in the first place.
9,1
This division is not perfect. For example, some may quarrel with my decision to
treat a condominium association as a consumer, but it seems to me that the members
of a condominium association, individual owners of condominiums, are likely to be in
the same position as consumers with regard to contracts for services in the building.
See Dana Point Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Keystone Serv. Co., 141 I11.
App. 3d
916, 491 N.E.2d 63 (App. Ct. 1986). I also included employees in the category of
"consumers" in cases involving employment relations. I find it appropriate to treat
cases between businesses and individuals of average sophistication together, in most
situations.
9 Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100,491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
98 Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116 (quoting Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co., 5 Ohio
App. 3d 203, 205, 451 N.E.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1982)). Two more cases illustrate that
employees are often at the mercy of employers who have no altruistic duties toward
employees. In one case, an employer was held not to have a duty to provide a
smoke-free environment for an employee even though the employer knew of the
employee's allergy to smoke at the time of employment. Bernard v. Cameron and
Colby Co., Inc., 397 Mass. 320, 491 N.E.2d 604 (1986). The court held that the
contract between the parties had no such requirement and that no such duty should
be implied because "there was nothing before the judge which would tend to show
[the employer's] assent to such a term." Id. at 606. In another case, the court held
that a school board was entitled, under a statute dealing with enrollment reductions,
to discharge a school psychologist with a term contract even if it was the board's own
decision to shift psychological services to local districts that caused the enrollment
decline. Bennett v. Board of Educ., 23 Ohio App. 3d 136, 491 N.E.2d 742 (Ct. App.
1986). In both of these cases, altruism would militate in favor of the opposite result
and paternalism would condemn the unequal power of the parties.
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The courts often treated the language of the contracts as dispositive of
consumers' claims, regardless of whether the contracts or the negotiating
processes indicated that domination was possible. For instance, one court
held that a contract for underinsured motorist coverage did not apply in a
situation where conflicting explanatory promotional material provided by
the insurance company made the provision ambiguous. The court looked at
the insurance policy and determined that the coverage did not apply, despite
the ambiguity. 99 A court also refused to construe a release contract made in
settlement of a libel lawsuit over a former employer's charges against a
former employee as prohibiting future allegedly libelous statements of the
same nature concerning the same transaction. The court held that it was
required to "enforce the agreement as written." 100 In both of these cases,
courts motivated by concerns of altruism might have construed the contracts
to force the stronger party to look out for the weaker party's interests. 0 1
(2) 1 found fewer cases in which consumers were helped by creative
construction or statutory application, but there were good examples of some
of the reforms mentioned by Collins. In two cases involving contracts
related to property of a marriage, surviving widows were allowed to avoid
the terms of contracts that would have prevented them from receiving
property to which they were otherwise entitled. 102 In the more interesting
case of the two, a woman signed a pre-nuptial agreement that limited her
rights after her husband's death to $700 per month. The husband then
transferred most of his property, without consideration, to his daughter. The
transfer made it impossible for the husband's estate to meet its obligation to

99 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Yoby, 23 Ohio App. 3d 51, 491 N.E.2d 360 (Ct. App.
1986). The dissent argued that the ambiguity should have been construed against the
insurance company. See id. at 55-56, 491 N.E.2d at 365 (Parrino, P.J., dissenting).
This would force the company to look out for the interests of its customers, and thus
make it altruistic. The rules which protect customers from confusing insurance
policies and conflicting promotional literature involve duties to refrain from making
confusing offers and from misrepresenting the contents of a contract. See H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 97.
100 \Costa v. Stephens-Adamson, Inc., 142 IIl. App. 3d 798, 491 N.E.2d 490, 492
(App. Ct. 1986) (citing Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 I11.2d 317, 323, 472 N.E.2d 791,
795 (1984)).
101In another case, an employee was helped by strict adherence to the terms of a
contract. The case involved a contract for severance pay for a bank president, a
contract which the bank claimed violated a federal statute. See First Nat'l Bank of
Danville v. Reynolds, 491 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). In strict contractual
cases, the courts have also refused to recognize tort claims that would avoid the
effects of the contracts. See, e.g., Bernard v. Cameron and Colby Co., Inc., 397
Mass. 320, 323-24, 491 N.E.2d 604, 607 (1986) (refusing to recognize claims for
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
102 See Cohen v. Estate of Cohen, 23 Ohio St. 3d 90, 491 N.E.2d 698 (1986);
Brewsaugh v. Brewsaugh, 23 Ohio Misc. 2d 19, 491 N.E.2d 748 (1986).
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the widow. Even though nothing in the contract limited the husband's right
to dispose of his property, the court imposed a constructive trust on the
transferred property to assure that the $700 obligation would be met. 103 This
placed an altruistic duty on the husband and the daughter to look out for the
widow's interests, and was obviously paternalistic by implying a term that
the widow did not obtain in her contract.
In another insurance case, the court construed an ambiguous "conditional" receipt against the insurance company and held that the insured had
been accepted for coverage. 10 4 This case is right in line with Collins's
altruistic duty to refrain from making a confusing offer. 105 The court held that
the contract was in force because a layman could reasonably believe that the
receipt was an acceptance for coverage. The court thus required the insurance company to pay attention to the interests of the consumer by explaining
06
the arrangement clearly.1
(3) Under Collins's analysis, one would expect that business contracts
would be enforced according to their terms because businesses are likely to
have the power and expertise to avoid one-sided contracts. Further,
businesses are likely to cooperate with one another because they know it is
in their own best interests to do so. Most of the cases involving businesses
that I read fit this pattern and enforced contracts according to their terms.
In one case, a court upheld a very low liquidated damages clause, despite
the close scrutiny that such clauses often receive. 107 The negligence of an
alarm service company allegedly allowed $4,000,000 to be stolen from
Purolator's offices. 10 The contract provided that the alarm service company
was not an "insurer" and that therefore liability for failure to provide the
agreed upon service was limited to the liquidated damages provision of
$50.109 The court held that since there was no evidence of a defect in the
negotiation process, the clause would be enforced. 110

103Cohen,

23 Ohio St. 3d at 92, 491 N.E.2d at 699-700.
See Wernle v. Country Life Ins. Co., 142 Ill. App. 3d 145, 491 N.E.2d 449
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
105 H. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 97.
106The court may also have been concerned about the unequal distribution of
power between the parties. Under the receipt, if the application were approved,
insurance would be effective as of the date of the receipt. If it were disapproved, no
insurance would issue at all, even for the period between the application and the
rejection. The company thus had unilateral power for the interim period and the
consumer might be uncertain for a time whether she had insurance. See Wernle, 142
Ill. App. 3d at 147-48, 491 N.E.2d at 450-51.
107 See Purolator Security, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Service, 141 11.
App. 3d
1106, 491 N.E.2d 161 (Il. App. Ct. 1986).
108 Id. at 1107, 491 N.E.2d at 161.
109 Id. at 1112, 491 N.E.2d at 164.
11o Id.
104
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In another case, the court held that a seller was in breach of its contract to
provide carpeting and that its attempt to cure its failure to deliver on time ten
days after the failed delivery could not cure the earlier breach." ' Even
though the delivery was already late, it would have been possible to allow
the seller another chance, especially in light of the U.C.C's liberalization of
the perfect tender rule by allowing a chance for cure. 1 2 Businesses may not
often need the courts to intercede since it is assumed they are capable of
looking after themselves.
(4) There were business dealings in which more attention was paid to
cooperation and protection of weaker parties. In one case, a lien law was
construed liberally to protect government contractors. 1 3 In another,
partners were held to high standards of care under traditional rules that make
partners fiduciaries for each other. 114 Thus, there was some evidence of
altruistic requirements in business relationships, although not nearly so
much as in consumer contracts. Paternalistic values are also less threatened
by strict adherence to contracts in the business setting.
It is difficult to come to any firm conclusions based on my review of these
cases. Contract law is a mixed bag, with different courts and different
jurisdictions treating disputes differently. Consumers are sometimes protected by the courts in the ways Collins says they are, but other times
consumers are left to live with bad contracts in the name of contractualism.
Businesses are usually held to their contracts, even though this sometimes
leads to domination and advantage-taking. Further, a sample of cases from
1986 does not tell me how much contract law has changed, although I think it
has, assuming that the nineteenth and early twentieth-century opinions in
the casebook with which I teach ' 5 reflect the legal climate of the times.
Further, in many cases, both business and consumer, the possibility of
unconscionability or fraud, due to overreaching in the bargaining, was
raised, although these claims were rarely successful in the cases. These
defenses were typically rejected in cases in which the terms of the contract

were unfair, and altruism or paternalism might have led a court to refuse to
enforce the agreement. 116 The possibility of voiding a contract on grounds of
unconscionability or fraud appears to stand as a safety valve to the enforce-

1 See June G. Ashton Interiors v. Stark Carpet Corp., 142 Ill. App. 3d 100, 491
N.E.2d 120 (App. Ct. 1986).
112 See U.C.C § 2-508(2) (1978).
113 See City of Chicago ex rel. Charles Equip. Co., v. United States Fidelity and
Guar. Co., 142 I11.App. 621, 491 N.E.2d 1269 (App. Ct. 1986).
114 See Donahue v. Draper, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 30, 491 N.E.2d 260 (App. Ct. 1986).
115 F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE & A. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
116 See, e.g., Estate of Kern v. Handelman, 142 II1.App. 3d 506, 491 N.E.2d 1275
(App. Ct. 1986); Dana Point Condominium Assoc. v. Keystone Serv. Co., 141 I11.
App. 3d 916, 491 N.E.2d 63 (App. Ct. 1986).
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ment of contracts, even where the results are one-sided and unfair. Defenses
such as fraud, unconscionability, duress, and unequal bargaining power may
not contribute to fairness in contract law; instead, they may give judges an
excuse for not policing the results of bargains that do not quite reach the
threshold of the defenses. The judge is able to point to the defenses as the
saving grace if the bargain is really bad, even though the defenses are rarely
employed to void a contract.
Reading these cases has reinforced my impression that it is difficult to
characterize the common law of contracts in general terms. Decision-making
power in contract law, and common law generally, is widely dispersed, and
it would be surprising if judges and legislators from the different jurisdictions
were in agreement much of the time. This does not mean that a theoretical
attempt to describe the law of contract is futile or useless, but it will always
face the problem that general theories lend themselves to contradictory
applications by different decisionmakers. No general theory that I have seen
succeeds in drawing lines in controversial cases. Collins's book is good
because instead of stating hard and fast rules of law, Collins illustrates
doctrinal tendencies and possibilities, identifies and acknowledges the limitations of his observations, and explains how those possibilities relate to the
values he thinks the law should and does advance. Collins's observations on
contract law are much more valuable than those contained in traditional
rule-packed hornbooks.
III.

CONCLUSION

Collins adopts the correct plan for his book, and he executes it well. My
criticisms should thus be read in light of my overall favorable impression. He
makes some important methodological arguments for contract theory, and
he opens up discussion of the values in contract law to a greater extent than
before. His analysis provides the framework for my analysis of the contemporary cases, and the values he identifies are helpful in understanding and

criticizing the whole body of contract law.
I am least convinced by his analysis of corporatism, because he has not
shown that the corporatist structure is democratic or altruistic. Insofar as
trade associations have imposed limits of conduct that exceed those of the
legal regulation of the marketplace, they have been a positive influence.
However, the distribution of wealth and power in society is extremely
unequal, and private institutions, as far as I know, have not embarked on a
program to change that fact.

